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Abstract 
Building on prior research on how boards should 
provide stakeholder transparency by disclosing on how 
their organizations are governing their IT assets, this 
paper provides an exploratory insight in the 
contemporary state of IT governance transparency in 
Belgian and South African companies. Specifically, the 
influence of the national corporate governance code on 
IT governance transparency is investigated by 
comparing both groups of companies. Our findings 
show that South African firms tend to be more 
concerned with IT governance transparency than 
Belgian firms, given a comparable IT strategic role 
and ownership structure. This result could be expected, 
as the South African corporate governance code, King 
III, contains specific IT (governance)-related guidance, 
while the Belgian code Lippens does not. Accordingly, 
the case is made for including more (non-committal) IT 
(governance)-related guidance in national corporate 
governance codes. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The potential benefits of IT governance are known for 
over a decade now. Weill & Ross [1] state that 
“effective IT governance is the single most important 
predictor of the value an organization generates from 
IT”. Many studies have surfaced that identified 
mechanisms for IT governance (e.g. [1]–[4]). Due to a 
direct link between corporate governance and IT 
governance [1], many corporate governance 
mechanisms are translated into the IT governance 
domain. An important issue in corporate governance 
literature is transparency, or disclosure [5]–[7]. 
However, the issue of IT governance 
transparency/disclosure, which is about providing 
stakeholders with information about the way the 
organization is governing its IT assets, has received 
little attention in academic research [8]. Joshi et al. [8] 
proposed a framework to assess the level of IT 
governance disclosure, together with a call for 
additional empirical research to contribute to the 
under-researched topic of IT governance disclosure. In 
response we aim to make an exploratory empirical 
contribution to the field of IT governance transparency. 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the 
influence of the national corporate governance code on 
a firm’s IT governance transparency. Indeed, there 
could be potential variations in IT governance 
disclosure due to variations in the national corporate 
governance code. This objective is approached by 
comparing the IT governance disclosure of two groups 
of firms: i.e. Belgian and South African firms. 
Differences in IT governance transparency between 
these two groups of companies can be expected, as the 
South African corporate governance code, King III, 
contains a significant amount of IT (governance)-
related guidance, while the Belgian code Lippens does 
not. While controlling for the IT strategic role and firm 
ownership structure, the investigation of the effect of 
the national corporate governance code on a firm’s 
tendency to disclose on its IT governance is an 
important contribution to extant literature. 
 
Following the problem statement and research 
objective discussed in the previous paragraph, the 
following research question is put forward: “To what 
extent does the national corporate governance code 
influence the level of IT governance disclosure of a 
firm?” 
From this research question, the following proposition 
is derived: Firms that are submitting their annual 
report based on a corporate governance code that 
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contains (non-committal) IT (governance)-related 
guidance disclose more on their IT governance 
compared to firms that are submitting their annual 
report based on a corporate governance code that 
contains no IT (governance)-related guidance. This 
proposition has important consequences for the 
sampling criteria, which will be discussed in the 
‘research approach’ section. It should be noted that this 
proposition serves a more directive purpose, rather 
than conclusive, as the small sample size (N=20) used 
in this research does not allow for formal statistical 
significance testing. Nevertheless, we aim to provide 
an in-depth qualitative discussion of the issues at hand. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
The second section provides a theoretical background 
to this research by discussing the concepts of IT 
governance and IT governance transparency, followed 
by a short discussion of the IT governance 
transparency framework by Joshi et al. [8], which will 
be used during our exploratory empirical research by 
serving as the measurement instrument of the IT 
governance disclosure construct. The third section 
presents the research scope and the research approach. 
The fourth section presents the results and conclusions 
of the empirical research. The fifth section presents the 
research implications (for theory and practice). Finally, 
the sixth section presents the limitations of this 
research, accompanied by translations into 
opportunities for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. IT governance 
 
IT governance is an integral part of corporate 
governance [9], considering IT governance exists in 
the realm of overall corporate governance [1]. De Haes 
& Van Grembergen [9, p. 2] define the concept as “an 
integral part of corporate governance and addresses 
the definition and implementation of processes, 
structures and relational mechanisms in the 
organization that enable both business and IT people 
to execute their responsibilities in support of 
business/IT alignment and the creation of business 
value from IT-enabled business investments”. Over 
time, IT governance gained momentum due to more 
companies becoming critically dependent on IT for 
their strategic and operational business activities [9], 
[10]. 
 
The above-mentioned definition by De Haes & Van 
Grembergen (op. cit.) clearly indicates that IT 
governance is an integral part of corporate governance, 
requiring involvement of the board. Due to this direct 
link between both concepts, many of the issues that are 
discussed regarding corporate governance also apply to 
IT governance [11]–[13]. Drawing on the ideas of 
corporate governance, IT governance can be 
implemented using structures, processes, and 
relational/communication mechanisms [3], [14]. In the 
IT governance body of knowledge, many different 
mechanisms are reported, such as strategy committees, 
steering committees, a portfolio management process, 
etc. [1]–[4]. An important issue in corporate 
governance literature is transparency [5]–[7]. However, 
the issue of IT governance transparency has received 
little attention to this date in academic research [8]. 
 
2.2. IT governance transparency 
 
The disclosure of non-financial information improves 
the value of a firm’s stock due to a reduction of 
information asymmetry [15]. Therefore, such 
disclosure is essential for organizations that are seeking 
for investors. As IT (governance)-related information 
is a subset of non-financial information, IT governance 
disclosure should also be considered by organizations 
as a means to improve firm value. The importance of 
transparency about IT governance is mentioned in 
literature [13], but is to this date vastly under-
researched compared to disclosure about overall 
corporate governance [8]. IT governance transparency 
can be defined as “the ability of firms to provide 
adequate and relevant IT governance information in a 
timely and effective manner to their stakeholders, such 
as investors, policy makers, and regulatory bodies, so 
that they can assess management’s behavior in using 
IT” [8, p. 118]. It should be noted that IT governance 
transparency can be about internal transparency (e.g. 
by making IT governance practices known on the 
firm’s intranet), as well as external transparency. It is 
important to stress that this research deals with public 
voluntarily disclosure about IT governance (i.e. with 
the goal of informing external stakeholders). The 
international good-practice framework for enterprise 
governance and management of IT, COBIT 5, also 
refers to the importance of ensuring stakeholder 
transparency in the context of IT governance. In its 
process reference model, COBIT 5 describes this 
process, EDM05 ‘Ensure stakeholder transparency’, as 
required to “ensure that enterprise IT performance and 
conformance measurement and reporting are 
transparent, with stakeholders approving the goals and 
metrics and the necessary remedial actions” [16, p. 
47]. 
 
Joshi et al. [8] present an IT governance disclosure 
framework based on the IT governance focus areas as 
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defined by the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) [17]. 
Specifically, their IT governance disclosure framework 
contains 39 disclosure items and is built around the 
following domains: IT strategic alignment, IT value 
delivery, IT risk management, and IT performance 
measurement. ‘IT strategic alignment’ deals with the 
fact that IT investments need to support the strategic 
goals and objectives of an organization in order to 
enable the creation of current and future business 
value. ‘IT value delivery’ is concerned with the 
optimization of IT-enabled value creation, where value 
is broader than strictly monetary (e.g. competitive 
advantage, higher employee productivity, etc.). ‘IT risk 
management’ is concerned with the protection of IT-
assets and recovery from IT-related disasters. Finally, 
‘IT performance measurement’ is related to the IT 
budget and IT investments. It is specifically concerned 
with the expenditure on IT resources and its 
association to business value. For this research, the IT 
governance disclosure framework will serve as 
operationalization of the IT governance disclosure 
construct. 
 
The conceptual model for this research is presented in 
Figure 1. This representation is based on Libby’s 
predictive validity framework [18], which emphasizes 
the important role of careful conceptual specification 
of constructs in theory-based empirical research. The 
dashed boxes represent the conceptual level, while the 
boxes below represent the operationalization of the 
concepts used in this research. The concept of IT 
governance transparency will be operationalized using 
the IT governance disclosure rate derived from the IT 
governance transparency framework by Joshi et al. [8]. 
The concept of corporate governance code will be 
operationalized by means of Boolean categorization: 
either the code contains (non-committal) IT 
(governance)-related guidance or it does not. This is to 
enable the comparison of IT governance disclosure 
between two groups of interest, in line with our 
proposition. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model and operationalization 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
3.1. Research scope 
 
This study focuses on public corporate disclosure of IT 
governance (i.e. with the goal of informing external 
stakeholders). To improve the internal validity of this 
research project, the research was scoped down in 
order to control for potential contingency factors. 
Specifically, this research project was scoped down to 
financial services organizations to control for IT 
strategic role, and to listed companies to control for 
ownership structure. For controlling IT strategic role, 
we follow Sohal & Fitzpatrick [19], who discern 
between “high tier industries” and “low tier 
industries”. High tier industries are characterized by 
the fact that IT is the most important factor to influence 
the core business of a company. Examples of such 
industries are banking, communications, and insurance. 
On the other hand, in low tier industries IT is generally 
used at an operational level only, to provide automated 
support of basic tasks. Examples of such industries are 
transportation, construction, manufacturing, and 
natural resources. Because of differences in IT 
strategic role between industries, there might also be 
differences in IT governance maturity [9], which could 
obscure the effect of the national corporate governance 
code (if any) on IT governance transparency. For 
controlling ownership structure, it was decided to only 
select listed companies, as the disclosure of non-
financial information improves the value of a firm’s 
stock, due to a reduction of information asymmetry 
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[15]. Hence, firms that are publicly listed can be 
expected to disclose more on their IT governance, as 
part of non-financial disclosure in general, compared to 
firms that are not publicly listed, as they have more 
incentive to do so. The focus on listed companies 
might therefore yield more interesting results. 
 
The corporate governance code of South Africa, King 
III, is a rather unique code as it contains directives on 
IT governance [20]. King III came into effect for South 
African entities starting from 1 March 2010 and is 
applicable to all entities (i.e. regardless of their size 
and whether or not they are listed). Specifically, King 
III contains seven IT governance principles (Table 1) 
and some additional more detailed recommended 
practices for each of these principles. Belgium has two 
corporate governance codes: the code Lippens for 
listed companies (often referred to as ‘code 2009’), and 
the code Buysse for non-listed companies. Both of 
these codes have in common, together with many 
corporate governance codes around the world, that they 
do not contain any specific IT (governance)-related 
guidance. To be technically correct, the code Lippens 
is applicable for this research, as we control for listed 
companies. King III and code Lippens both start from 
the “comply-or-explain” principle, ultimately meaning 
that the guidance contained in the codes is non-
committal. 
 
In summary, only listed financial services 
organizations from Belgium and South Africa will be 
sampled. This is done to improve the internal validity 
of this exploratory research, as well as to enable the 
comparison of two groups as stated in the proposition. 
 
Table 1. King III IT governance principles 
Principle Description 
5.1 The board should be responsible for 
information technology governance. 
5.2 IT should be aligned with the performance 
and sustainability objectives of the entity. 
5.3 The board should delegate the 
responsibility for the implementation of an 
IT governance framework to management. 
5.4 The board should monitor and evaluate 
significant IT investments and 
expenditure. 
5.5 IT should form an integral part of the 
entity’s risk management process. 
5.6 The board should ensure that information 
assets are managed effectively. 
5.7 A risk committee and audit committee 
should assist the board in carrying out its 
IT responsibilities. 
 
3.2. Research approach 
 
The research started with a literature review to anchor 
the study and to define the main concepts used in the 
research project. For the empirical research stage, the 
following approach was used. First, the research deals 
with a purposive sample of firms conform the scope. 
Specifically, two groups of ten firms are selected. This 
smaller sample size is due to our specific focus to 
improve the internal validity of the research. The first 
group consists of Belgian financial services firms that 
are listed on Euronext Brussels, while the second group 
consists of South African financial services firms that 
are listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
(JSE). The selection of these groups is in line with the 
specified research question and proposition. It should 
be noted that the goal of this paper is not to provide a 
high level of generalizability of the results. Rather, we 
focus on the internal validity of the research, while 
providing an in-depth view on the issues that are 
investigated. The final sample is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Firms in the sample (N=20) 
Belgian group South African group 
Ageas ABSA Bank Limited 
Ascencio Alexander Forbes Group 
Holdings 
Befimmo Clientele Limited 
Dexia Discovery Holdings 
Limited 
GBL Grindrod Bank 
Iep Invest Liberty Holdings 
Limited 
KBC MMI Holdings Limited 
Nationale Bank van 
België 
Sanlam 
Sofina Santam 
Solvac Sasfin Bank 
 
For each firm in the sample the English annual report 
of 2014 was obtained and analyzed, as these were the 
most recent available at the time. The annual report is a 
public disclosure document that is available for all 
firms. Additionally, Joshi et al. [8] found that the 
annual report seems to be the preferred medium for 
sharing information regarding IT governance. The 
analysis of the annual reports of 2014 for all firms 
implies a cross-sectional analysis. The qualitative data 
analysis procedure that was used is conceptual content 
analysis, also known as thematic analysis. This enables 
the analysis of the existence and frequencies of 
concepts of interest based on a coding frame [21], and 
is therefore very suitable for our purpose. Applied to 
this research, IT governance disclosure items will be 
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identified in the annual reports, using the IT 
governance disclosure framework [8] as a coding 
frame. Each annual report is manually analyzed, 
applying dichotomous coding for each disclosure item 
in the framework (i.e. a score of ‘1’ if the item is 
present in the annual report and a score of ‘0’ 
otherwise). Joshi et al. [8] provide a definition for each 
disclosure item that was included in the disclosure 
framework, hence improving the content or face 
validity of the items and as such supporting the 
objectivity of the coding process. For each category of 
the IT governance disclosure framework, an ‘IT 
governance disclosure rate’ can be calculated as 
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
4. Results 
 
In order to provide an answer to the research question 
(and the proposition that was derived from this 
research question), an analysis was performed between 
financial services organizations that are listed on 
Euronext Brussels (and therefore subject to the Belgian 
code Lippens), and financial services organizations that 
are listed on the Johannesburg securities exchange (and 
therefore subject to the South African code King III). 
The results of this analysis are first overviewed at the 
level of the disclosure categories in Table 3. The group 
with the highest average disclosure rate for each 
disclosure category is bold-faced. 
 
Table 3. Reporting rate per disclosure category 
 Belgian 
companies 
(N=10) 
South 
African 
companies 
(N=10) 
Full 
sample 
(N=20) 
IT strategic 
alignment 
8% 25% 16.5% 
IT value 
delivery 
6% 38% 22% 
IT risk 
management 
21% 33% 27% 
IT 
performance 
measurement 
16% 29% 22.5% 
Average 12.75% 31.25% 22% 
 
This first global overview of IT governance 
transparency between both groups shows that the listed 
South African financial services organizations seem to 
be more concerned with disclosing on their IT 
governance than the listed Belgian financial services 
organizations. This observation holds for all disclosure 
categories of the IT governance transparency 
framework. This result could be expected, as King III 
contains (non-committal) IT (governance)-related 
guidance while the code Lippens does not. We 
conclude that our empirical research points at some 
evidence for the justification of the proposition. Table 
3 also globally indicates that there are potential 
opportunities for the firms in our sample to improve on 
their IT governance transparency. While this is true for 
both groups, it is especially true for the Belgian firms. 
 
Next, we investigate the IT governance disclosure at 
item-level, which enables some deeper discussion. 
These results are displayed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Item-level reporting rates 
IT strategic alignment items BE 
(N=10) 
SA 
(N=10) 
IT expert on the board 1/10 2/10 
IT expert with experience on the 
board 
0 2/10 
A CIO or an equivalent position 
in the firm 
3/10 5/10 
IT committee 0 3/10 
IT risk is part of audit committee 
or risk committee 
3/10 6/10 
IT is part of audit committee 1/10 4/10 
IT steering committee 0 3/10 
IT planning committee 0 0 
Technology committee 0 1/10 
IT committee at an executive 
level 
1/10 1/10 
CIO or equivalent is on the board 0 1/10 
Reporting rate (average) 8% 25% 
IT value delivery items BE 
(N=10) 
SA 
(N=10) 
IT governance 
framework/standard: 
ITIL/COBIT/ISO etc. 
0 9/10 
IT as an issue in the board 
meeting 
0 6/10 
Suggestion/decision/advise by the 
board on IT 
0 1/10 
Special report/section on IT/IT 
projects in annual report 
1/10 8/10 
IT mentioned as a strategic 
business issue 
3/10 7/10 
IT projected as strength 0 3/10 
IT projected as opportunity 0 2/10 
Project updates or comments 2/10 3/10 
IT is explicitly mentioned for 
achieving specific business 
objectives 
1/10 3/10 
Comments/updates on IT 
performance 
1/10 2/10 
IT training 0 4/10 
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Green IT 0 0 
Direction and status about IT 
outsourcing and in-sourcing 
0 1/10 
Reporting rate (average) 6% 38% 
IT risk management items BE 
(N=10) 
SA 
(N=10) 
IT is referred under the 
operational risk 
6/10 5/10 
Special IT risk management 
program 
3/10 2/10 
Use of IT for regulation and 
compliance 
0 5/10 
IT/electronic data processing 
(EDP) audit 
0 2/10 
Information and security 
policy/plan (IT security) 
2/10 5/10 
The role of IT in accounting and 
the reporting standards (IAS) 
2/10 2/10 
Operations continuity plan 2/10 2/10 
Reporting rate (average) 21% 33% 
IT performance measurement 
items 
BE 
(N=10) 
SA 
(N=10) 
Explicit information on IT 
expenditure 
0 4/10 
IT budget 0 0 
IT hardware cost 4/10 4/10 
IT software cost 6/10 7/10 
Explicit IT manpower cost is 
mentioned 
0 0 
IT expenses are mentioned under 
administrative cost 
0 1/10 
IT related assets are mentioned 
under intangible assets 
3/10 7/10 
Direct cost on IT is mentioned in 
currency or percentage 
0 0 
Reporting rate (average) 16% 29% 
 
The group with the highest disclosure rate for each 
item is bold-faced (both groups in the case of a draw). 
In line with the previous discussion about the results 
per disclosure category, the South African companies 
show higher reporting rates on almost all of the 
individual items. 
 
4.1. IT strategic alignment 
With an average of 16.5% over the whole sample 
(N=20), ‘strategic alignment’ is the least reported upon 
among the four disclosure categories of the IT 
governance transparency framework. This is a 
surprising result, since IT governance is the 
responsibility of the board [9] and the majority of the 
items in the IT strategic alignment category are 
specifically situated at the board level (e.g. ‘IT expert 
on the board’, ‘IT expert with experience on the 
board’, ‘CIO or equivalent is on the board’, ‘IT 
committee’ etc.). Academic literature indicates that a 
high degree of board involvement in IT governance, 
and IT experience at the board, has a positive effect on 
organizational performance [10], [22], [23]. Despite 
acknowledging the importance of board involvement in 
IT governance, Nolan & McFarlan [10] state that 
boards are often not aware of the importance of IT 
when it comes to supporting corporate objectives and 
the need for alignment between the overall corporate 
strategy and the IT strategy. Additionally, the board is 
often incapable to ask IT management “the right 
questions” due to a lack of expertise, leading to the 
inability to effectively monitor the management of IT 
[23]. Strategic alignment is also often perceived as a 
very complex challenge, to the point where decision 
makers are unsure about how to approach the 
alignment challenge [24]. It should also be noted that 
putting the CIO (or equivalent) on the board, putting an 
IT expert at the board, or putting an IT committee in 
place at the level of the board, can help in solving these 
issues [3]. This seems to be an opportunity for the 
organizations in the sample, as for instance only one 
South African firm explicitly reports having a CIO or 
equivalent on the board, and only three South African 
firms report on having a board-level IT committee. 
None of the Belgian firms report on these two items. 
The previous discussion is entirely in line with 
principle 5.1 of King III, i.e. “the board should be 
responsible for IT governance”, clearly pointing at the 
need for board involvement in IT governance. The 
issue of strategic alignment is articulated in principle 
5.2 of King III, i.e. “IT should be aligned with the 
performance and sustainability objectives of the 
company”. 
 
When the CIO (or equivalent) is not on the board, the 
firm can still have such a position. Practice 5.3.3 of 
King III states that “the CEO should appoint a CIO 
responsible for the management of IT”. Remarkably, 
only half of the firms in the South African sample 
report on the existence of a CIO position (or 
equivalent) at the firm. The importance of a CIO 
position has also been the subject of academic 
research. Chatterjee, Richardson, & Zmud [25] found 
that investors tend to reward the announcement of a 
new CIO position in organizations that are operating in 
an industry that is subject to IT-enabled transformation 
(like financial services). The CIO appointment enables 
confidence in the capability of the firm to effectively 
manage its IT assets. While it is not explicitly 
articulated in King III that the CIO should be on the 
board, King III’s recommended practice 5.3.4 states 
that “the CIO should be a suitably qualified and 
experienced person who should have access and 
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interact regularly on strategic IT matters with the 
board and/or appropriate board committee and 
executive management”. 
 
Strategic alignment items ‘IT risk is part of audit 
committee or risk committee’ and ‘IT is part of audit 
committee’ can be linked to King III’s principle 5.7 ‘A 
risk committee and audit committee should assist the 
board in carrying out its IT responsibilities’. This 
might explain why these items are reported upon more 
frequently by the South African firms in the sample. 
Strategic alignment item ‘IT steering committee’ is 
addressed in recommended practice 5.3.2 of King III: 
“The board may appoint an IT steering committee or 
similar function to assist with its governance of IT”. 
Only 3 out of 10 South African firms report on having 
such an IT steering committee (as opposed to 0 Belgian 
firms), which might be due to the careful formulation 
of this recommended practice (i.e. ‘may’ instead of 
‘should’). 
 
4.2. IT value delivery 
 
For the IT value delivery category, the difference of 
the average reporting rate between Belgian and South 
African firms is largest. For the Belgian firms, it is the 
category which is with 6% least reported upon, while 
for the South African firms it is the category which is 
with 38% most frequently reported upon. When it 
comes to IT value delivery in general, King III’s 
recommended practice 5.4.1 explicitly states that “the 
board should oversee the value delivery of IT and 
monitor the return on investment from significant IT 
projects”. Academic research has already identified the 
importance of disclosing about IT investments. 
Investors tend to reward disclosure about IT 
investments when they expect that these investments 
will have a positive effect on current and future 
business value [26], [27]. 
 
There are a few items in the IT value delivery category 
that are very dominant in establishing the large 
difference in average disclosure rate between the 
Belgian and South African firms. First, ‘IT governance 
framework/standard’ is reported upon by 9 out of 10 
South African firms as opposed to 0 Belgian firms. 
This can potentially be attributed to King III’s 
principle 5.3, which specifically mentions that an IT 
governance framework should be implemented by 
management. Second, ‘IT as an issue in the board 
meetings’ is reported upon by 6 out of 10 South 
African firms as opposed to 0 Belgian firms. Once 
more, this can be linked to King III’s principle 5.1 in 
general, and recommended practice 5.1.1 in specific: 
“The board should assume the responsibility for the 
governance of IT and place it on the board agenda”. 
Third, the item ‘special report/section on IT/IT projects 
in annual report’ was found in 8 out of 10 South 
African firms as opposed to 1 out of 10 Belgian firms. 
As King III contains a chapter dedicated to IT 
governance, addressing several principles and 
recommended practices, it makes sense for firms to 
cluster these issues in their annual reports. As 
previously stated, the Belgian code Lippens does not 
contain any IT governance principles or practices. It is 
also our belief that including a specific section on IT-
related matters in the annual report enables firms to 
think about ways to disclose on their IT governance 
and IT management arrangements, thereby increasing 
their overall IT governance transparency. Indeed, 
South African firms appear to be guided in this 
direction because of the contents of King III. 
 
4.3. IT risk management 
 
The IT risk management category is with 21% the most 
frequently reported upon category for the Belgian firms 
in the sample, while still trailing behind the South 
African firms in average disclosure rate. For the South 
African firms, IT risk management is with 33% the 
second most reported upon of the four disclosure 
categories. King III also contains specific principles 
and recommended practices in the area of IT risk 
management and IT security. Principle 5.5 is ‘IT 
should form an integral part of the company’s risk 
management’. Additionally, King III’s recommended 
practice 5.7.2 states that “The risk committee should 
obtain appropriate assurance that controls are in place 
and effective in addressing IT risks”. It is therefore 
somewhat surprising that IT risk management item 
‘special IT risk management program’ is only 
mentioned in 2 out of 10 annual reports of South 
African financial services organizations. South African 
firms report considerably more on ‘use of IT for 
regulation and compliance’, which is somewhat related 
to King III’s recommended practice 5.5.2: “the board 
should ensure that the company complies with IT laws 
and that IT related rules, codes and standards are 
considered”. South African firms also appear to be 
more concerned with reporting on IT security 
compared to Belgian firms. King III’s recommended 
practices belonging to principle 5.6 are especially 
related to this disclosure item: 5.6.1 “the board should 
ensure that there are systems in place for the 
management of information which should include 
information security, information management and 
information privacy”; 5.6.2 “the board should ensure 
that all personal information is treated by the company 
as an important business asset and is identified”; 5.6.3 
“the board should ensure that an information security 
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management system is developed and implemented”; 
and 5.6.4 “the board should approve the information 
security strategy and delegate and empower 
management to implement the strategy”. Despite all of 
these IT security-related recommended practices in 
King III, we find only half of the South African firms 
in the sample to be reporting on this IT security item. 
This is especially noteworthy as we are dealing strictly 
with financial services organizations, a sector which is 
known to be dealing with large amounts of confidential 
data, making IT security a necessity. Academic 
research also indicates the need for IT security. For 
instance, Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou [28] found 
that a security breach, leading to unauthorized access 
to confidential data has a significant negative impact 
on the value of a firm’s stock. Gordon, Loeb, & Sohail 
[29] found a positive correlation between the 
voluntarily disclosure about information security and 
the market value of a company. 
 
4.4. IT performance measurement 
 
The IT performance measurement category shows no 
significant differences in reporting rates between 
Belgian and South African firms. There are three 
dominant categories in this group: ‘IT software cost’; 
‘IT related assets are mentioned under intangible 
assets’; and ‘IT hardware cost’. This appears to be true 
for the Belgian firms as well as the South African 
firms. King III does not contain any directives in its 
principles and recommended practices relating to IT 
performance measurement. Nevertheless, a possible 
explanation for the dominance of these items can be 
found in financial reporting regulation. Listed 
companies need to report their consolidated annual 
reports following the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). IAS 38 puts software under intangible 
assets. Unsurprisingly, most Belgian and South African 
firms in our sample specifically mention software cost 
and place it under intangible assets in their financial 
statements. Belgian and South African firms tend to 
report on hardware cost as well in their financial 
statements, which falls under IAS 16 regulation. 
 
‘Explicit information on IT expenditure’ is more 
reported by South African firms than Belgian firms. 
The former firms disclose this specific item in 4 out of 
10 cases, while this is true for none of the Belgian 
firms. This might be seen in the overall realm of more 
IT governance transparency for the South African 
firms: when most annual reports contain a specific 
section with attention for IT-related matters, it also 
makes sense to provide more detail on IT-related 
expenses in the financial statements. This is therefore a 
clear opportunity for the Belgian firms in the sample to 
be more transparent about. In the practitioner area, IT 
managers report that IT expenditure is a critical 
attention point for them. According to ITGI [30] 
survey results, 45.3% of the respondents were planning 
initiatives to reduce IT expenditure. Also, 38.7% of the 
respondents indicated that the increasing IT 
expenditure was perceived as a problem. Considering 
this, it is strange that none of the annual reports 
contains information about the IT budget, as this is 
clearly a related issue. The estimation of IT-related 
costs is notoriously difficult [31]. As firms have 
difficulties in estimating the IT budget, they might also 
be reluctant to reporting these figures in their annual 
reports. Another plausible reason for the absence of IT 
budget in the annual reports might be that firms are 
attempting to reduce proprietary costs. 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provided an exploratory insight in the 
contemporary state of IT governance transparency in 
Belgian and South African firms. We started from the 
premise that the issue of IT governance transparency 
has received little attention in academic research. The 
main objective of this paper was to explore the 
influence of the national corporate governance code on 
IT governance transparency. This objective was 
approached by comparing the IT governance 
disclosure, using an established IT governance 
transparency framework from literature, of two groups 
of firms (i.e. Belgian and South African firms). These 
groups were purposively chosen, as the South African 
corporate governance code King III contains specific 
IT governance guidance, while the Belgian code 
Lippens does not. While controlling for the IT strategic 
role by focusing on financial services organizations 
only, and firm ownership structure by focusing only on 
listed companies; the investigation of the effect of the 
national corporate governance code on a firm’s 
tendency to disclose on its IT governance was 
explored. 
 
The main conclusion of this exploratory research is 
that the listed South African financial services 
organizations seem to be more concerned with 
disclosing on their IT governance than the listed 
Belgian financial services organizations. This 
observation holds for all disclosure categories of the IT 
governance transparency framework. Nevertheless, 
there are still potential opportunities for the firms in 
our sample to improve on their IT governance 
transparency. While this is true for both groups, it is 
especially true for the Belgian firms, as this group is 
trailing behind the South African group for all 
categories of the disclosure framework. Subsequent 
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analysis at the item-level also indicates that many of 
the items on which South African firms tend to report 
frequently can be directly related to the IT governance 
principles and recommended practices contained in the 
King III corporate governance code. We therefore 
conclude that the higher IT governance transparency of 
the South African firms might very well be attributed 
to the contents of their national corporate governance 
code. 
 
5. Implications (for theory and practice)  
 
From an academic point of view, this research adds to 
the relatively unexplored domain of IT governance 
transparency. Specifically, this research adds to the 
empirical backbone of IT governance transparency as a 
research subject in general, and the IT governance 
disclosure framework in specific. This research extends 
prior empirical research regarding IT governance 
disclosure by investigating the influence of the national 
corporate governance code on IT governance 
transparency. Using the Joshi et al. [8] IT governance 
disclosure framework, we were able to collect some 
preliminary empirical evidence in support of the 
indicated proposition. 
 
From a practitioners’ stance, we believe that this 
exploratory research illustrates the need for including 
IT governance-related directives in national corporate 
governance codes. As IT becomes more pervasive in 
firms all over the world, it makes sense for firms to be 
transparent about these, often very important, IT-
related matters; and for national corporate governance 
codes to guide firms in such a direction. This study 
also help to explore the fundamental role of corporate 
governance principles in shaping IT governance 
practices at firm level by providing evidence that the 
presence of IT-related principles in corporate 
governance codes can encourage firms in 
disseminating IT governance information in public 
documents. The importance of IT governance 
transparency should also be stressed outside the 
national corporate governance code. In its current 
edition, the international good-practice framework 
COBIT 5 already refers to the importance of ensuring 
stakeholder transparency in the context of IT 
governance. However, this discussion remains rather 
high-level and abstract. Practitioners would certainly 
benefit from more specific guidelines regarding IT 
governance transparency for different stakeholder 
groups as part of the COBIT framework. 
 
6. Limitations and opportunities for future 
research  
In this final section, we discuss the limitations of our 
research and identify related opportunities for future 
work. First, this research only deals with disclosed 
information. There could very well be discrepancies 
between what is reported and what is implemented 
regarding IT governance. For instance, an organization 
may have a dedicated CIO function, but it is possible 
that this is not explicitly mentioned in their annual 
report. It would therefore be very interesting to link 
this study with IT governance maturity to detect 
discrepancies between the IT governance 
implementation in organizations and their disclosure. 
Second, this study deals with a relatively small sample 
size (N=20). This was motivated by a strong focus on 
the internal validity of the research and an in-depth 
discussion of the issues, but it stands without question 
that a large-sample study would be interesting. If the 
sample size is large enough, statistically significant 
differences in the proportions could be tested for using 
z-tests, which in turn would increase the reliability of 
the results. Another opportunity for future research is 
data triangulation. This study only used annual reports 
as a data source. This was motivated by the fact that 
annual reports seem to be the preferred medium for IT 
governance-related disclosure. Nevertheless, data 
triangulation using additional data sources (e.g. press 
releases, company website, etc.) would enable a richer 
understanding of a firm’s IT governance disclosure. 
Finally, this research only deals with the quantity of 
publicly available IT (governance)-related information. 
It would be interesting to also investigate the quality of 
such information, as is sometimes analyzed in the area 
of corporate governance disclosure. 
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